From the global to the local: The role of international law in the enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa by Kapindu, Redson

2009
Socio-Economic Rights Project
COMMUNITY LAW CENTRE
University of the Western Cape
From the global to the local
The role of international law in the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa
Redson Edward Kapindu
Redson Edward Kapindu
ii
Published by the Community Law Centre, University of the Western 
Cape, Private Bag X17, Bellville 7535, South Africa
Tel: 021 959 2950; Fax: 021 959 2411
Internet: www.communitylawcentre.org.za
ISBN: 978-1-86808-700-6
© 2009 Community Law Centre (University of the Western Cape)
Editing and production: Page Arts cc, Cape Town
Printing: Creda Press
iii
From the global to the local
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS ANd AbbREvIATIONS v
ACKNOWLEdgMENTS vii
ExECUTIvE SUMMARY viii 
 
1 INTROdUCTION 1
2 OvERvIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN   
RIgHTS LAW SYSTEM 6
2.1 Sources of international human rights law 7
2.2 The UN human rights system in a nutshell 8
2.2.1 Charter-based system 9
2.2.1.1 The UN Charter 9
2.2.1.2  The Universal declaration of Human 
 Rights 10
2.2.1.3  Soft law instruments 10
2.2.1.4  The Human Rights Council and its 
 Advisory Committee 11
2.2.1.5  The Office of the High Commissioner 
 for Human Rights 12
2.2.1.6  Committee on Economic, Social and 
 Cultural Rights 12
2.2.2  Treaty-based system 12
2.2.2.1  International Covenant on Economic, 
 Social and Cultural Rights  12
2.2.2.2  International Covenant on Civil and 
 Political Rights 15
2.2.2.3  Other principal treaties with 
 socio-economic rights obligations 17
2.2.3  Special procedures 17
2.3  Regional systems 18
2.3.1  African human rights system 18
2.3.1.1 The African Charter on Human and 
 Peoples’ Rights and the African 
 Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
 Rights 18
2.3.1.2  Special mechanisms 22
Redson Edward Kapindu
iv
2.3.2  A synopsis of other regions 23
2.3.2.1  European human rights system 23
2.3.2.2  Inter-American human rights system 23
3 THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIgHTS   
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 24
3.1 International agreements 25
3.2 Customary international law 25
3.3 bill of rights approach 26
4 APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL   
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIgHTS ObLIgATIONS   
IN SOUTH AFRICA 28
4.1 State of domestication of international socio-economic 
 rights obligations in South Africa 28 
4.1.1  Influence of international law in South Africa’s 
 constitutional architecture  29
4.1.2 Influence of international law in legislation 30
4.1.2.1 Labour rights 30
4.1.2.2 Housing rights 32
4.1.2.4 Social security rights 35
4.1.3 International human rights law and South African 
Courts 36
4.1.3.1 Labour rights jurisprudence 36
4.1.3.2 Housing rights jurisprudence 38
4.1.3.3 Health rights jurisprudence 40
4.1.3.4 Social security rights jurisprudence 41
4.2 Minimum core obligations and the South African approach: 
 Grootboom and subsequent jurisprudence  42
5. CHALLENgES ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL   
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 48
6 gENERAL CONCLUSION 50
vFrom the global to the local
ACRONYMS ANd AbbREvIATIONS
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights
African Charter 
African on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child
African Children’s Charter
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights
African Commission
African National Congress ANC
African Union AU
African Union Convention Governing 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa 
AU Refugee Convention 
American Convention on Human Rights American Convention
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997
BCEA 
Charter of the United Nations UN Charter
Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment
CAT
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women
CEDAW 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination
CERD 
Convention on the Rights of all Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families
Migrant Workers’ 
Convention
Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
CESCR
Economic and Social Council ECOSOC 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 EEA 
European Committee of Social Rights ECSR
European Social Charter ESC
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 ESTA  
Human Rights Council HRC
Redson Edward Kapindu
vi
Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights
Inter-American Commission
International Court of Justice ICJ
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights
ICCPR
Intrnational Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights
ICESCR
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 LRA
non-governmental organisation NGO
Organisation for Security and Co-operation OSCE
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998
PIE
Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa
African Women’s Protocol
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 RHA
South African Institute for Advanced 
Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and 
International Law
SAIFAC
United Nations UN
United Nations General Assembly UNGA
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights
UNHCHR
Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR
universal periodic review UPR
World Health Organization WHO
 
vii
From the global to the local
ACKNOWLEdgMENTS
This paper was prepared with financial support from the Norwegian 
Embassy through the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights and with 
supplementary funding from the Ford Foundation. The views ex-
pressed do not necessarily represent the official views of the Norwe-
gian Embassy, the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights or the Ford 
Foundation.
While I am responsible for the final version of this paper, I wish 
to express my gratitude to the Socio-Economic Rights Project of the 
Community Law Centre for the opportunity to conduct this research 
on its behalf. I am greatly indebted to Lilian Chenwi, Project Co-ordi-
nator and Senior Researcher: Socio-Economic Rights Project, for her 
invaluable comments and support in writing the paper. I would also 
like to thank the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, 
Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC), and in par-
ticular David Bilchitz, the Director of SAIFAC, for providing me with 
the institutional space and encouragement to write this paper.
Redson Edward Kapindu
viii
ExECUTIvE SUMMARY
International law occupies an important space in South African law, 
particularly within the framework of the Constitution. Sections 231 
and 232 of the Constitution provide for mechanisms for the direct ap-
plication of international law in South Africa and section 39(1)(b) re-
quires that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
must consider international law. This is a peremptory requirement. 
This study argues that a decision premised on the application of the 
Bill of Rights, in which applicable or relevant norms of international 
human rights law are not considered, would be defective (made per 
incuriam), and would thus not apply as binding or highly persuasive 
precedent in that regard. 
This paper demonstrates that international human rights law 
played a quintessential role in the drafting of the Constitution of 
South Africa, 1996, particularly the Bill of Rights, and that this was 
more so with regard to socio-economic rights where the provisions of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) highly influenced the guarantees of these rights under the 
Constitution, both in terms of language and content. The cases of In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(First Certification case); Certification of the Amended Text of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Second Certification 
case); and Government of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others (Grootboom case), among others, demonstrate this point.
ix
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The influence of international law has percolated into the drafting 
of various pieces of legislation hinging on socio-economic rights. In 
some areas, such as legislation on housing, such influence has been 
implicit; whereas in others, such as under labour law and refugee law, 
the influence of and reference to international law has been explicit. 
The role of international human rights law has been even more pro-
nounced in the South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence that 
has developed since 1994. Courts have referred to and applied inter-
national human rights law norms directly. For instance, with regard 
to the question of evictions, the relevance of the ICESCR and General 
Comment 7 of the United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is evident in the case of Residents 
of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Oth-
ers. Also, in Discovery Health Limited v Commissioner for Concilia-
tion, Mediation and Arbitration and Others, the Labour Court applied 
the Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families even though South Africa has not yet ratified it.
This paper argues, however, that there are some areas where courts 
have fallen short in their appreciation and/or application of interna-
tional human rights law. The refusal by the Constitutional Court to 
embrace the concept of minimum core obligations in the Grootboom 
case, for instance, is particularly troubling. In Minister of Health 
and Others v Treatment Action Campaign, the Constitutional Court, 
among other things, introduced some confusion in the otherwise set-
tled terrain of the justiciability of socio-economic rights in South Af-
rica, first, by suggesting that courts are ill-equipped and not institu-
tionally competent to deal with matters that have multiple social and 
economic consequences on communities; second, by failing to consider 
General Comment 14 of the CESCR; and consequently, by also failing 
to adjudicate on the content of the right to health. 
Another concern is that in several prominent cases, the Constitu-
tional Court has been reluctant or unwilling to explore the relevance 
of international human rights law in its decisions. These include Soo-
bramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal and Khosa and Others 
v Minister of Social Development and Others, where the Court failed 
to consider international law. In yet others, such as Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers, the Court merely made a fleeting 
reference to international law, as if only to barely comply with the 
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obligation to consider such, without any well considered reasoning on 
its relevance to the decision.
Further, there is a worry that in their consideration of interna-
tional human rights law, courts and other institutions, including Par-
liament, when enacting its legislation, and civil society organisations/
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), when prosecuting cases or 
appearing as amici curiae (friends of the Court) in courts, have paid 
little regard to the African human rights system. It is unclear whether 
this is out of a lack of familiarity with the system, or a low opinion of 
it, but there are advantages to be gained from a candid consideration 
thereof. 
This paper concludes with some recommendations. For instance, it 
recommends more vigilance and creativity in the application of inter-
national human rights law, both directly where applicable, and as an 
interpretive tool when enacting legislation, making policy, litigating 
or adjudicating on socio-economic rights in South Africa.
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1 INTROdUCTION
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small plac-
es, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen 
on any map of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual 
person: the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or college he 
attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the 
places where every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, 
equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless 
these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning any-
where. Without concerned citizen action to uphold them close to 
home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.1
The international human rights law regime is a normative and in-
stitutional system codifying the consciousness and conscientiousness 
for moral imperatives that developed out of depravity and adversity: 
specifically, in reaction to the horrors of the Second World War. Before 
the war, save for a few occasional exceptions, ‘international law was 
generally not concerned with how states treated individuals within 
their own borders’.2 Such matters were viewed as falling within the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of each state. International law dis-
course was hugely dominated by the principle of state sovereignty and 
under this broad principle, what a government did to its own citizens 
‘was its own affair and beyond the reach of international law or legal 
intervention by other States’.3
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This world view was abandoned during and in the immediate after-
math of the Second World War. The ordeals of the war triggered a re-
awakening of the critical importance of fundamental moral principles, 
including the principle that human beings possess basic fundamental 
and inalienable rights.4 Thus, when the Charter of the United Na-
tions (UN Charter) was adopted in 1945 establishing the UN, it was 
expressly stated, among other things, that the Charter was adopted to 
‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small’.5 It included the promotion and protection 
of human rights among its purposes, expressed in articles 1, 55 and 
56. Former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, eloquently 
expressed the nature and character of human rights in his opening 
remarks at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 
Austria, when he stated:
The human rights we are about to discuss here at Vienna are not 
the lowest common denominator among all nations, but rather 
what I should like to describe as the “irreducible human ele-
ment”, in other words, the quintessential values through which 
we affirm together that we are a single human community. As 
an absolute yardstick, human rights constitute the common lan-
guage of humanity.6
It has been urged that today, ‘human rights law is the core of inter-
national law’.7 Although article 2(7) of the Charter contains a caveat 
that nothing contained in it authorises the UN or any of its members 
to intervene in matters which are ‘essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction’ of any other state, consistent international law jurispru-
dence and scholarship, as well as norms arising out of international 
agreements, clearly demonstrate that issues of human rights are not 
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state; and that, on the contrary, they are the concern of the interna-
tional community at large. For instance, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has held that human rights obligations are by their very 
nature ‘the concern of all States’ and that in view of their importance, 
‘all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection’.8 
Carozza, affirming this position, states: 
[a]s any basic, mainstream introduction to the subject would 
tend to emphasise, the central innovation of human rights law 
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within international law was the idea that a state’s treatment 
of its own citizens is a matter of international concern, a basic 
value of the international community.9 
Since the adoption of the UN Charter, a large number of human rights 
instruments have been adopted both at the global (UN) and regional 
levels10 and socio-economic rights have formed an integral part of the 
internationally recognised catalogue of human rights that has sub-
sequently developed.11 International law norms and principles have 
had a profound effect in fashioning the development of domestic hu-
man rights norms and principles around the world.12 This effect seems 
more pronounced in the domain of socio-economic rights. As Porter 
puts it:
Whether in litigation, public advocacy or academic discourse, 
those working in the area of social and economic rights have 
relied extensively on international human rights law, and par-
ticularly on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to elucidate the content and meaning 
of rights.13
Porter urges that even where social and economic rights achieve ex-
plicit protection in domestic law, as in the case of South Africa’s new 
constitutional democracy, the paucity of domestic jurisprudence and 
judicial unfamiliarity with social and economic rights has meant that 
courts, NGOs, academics and politicians have continued and will con-
tinue to run to international human rights law for guidance.14
In the context of the South African 1996 Constitution (the Consti-
tution), Liebenberg locates the pertinent role and influence of inter-
national human rights law in the architecture of the various guaran-
tees of socio-economic rights, and her account resonates with Porter’s 
propositions above. She states that:
A perusal of the relevant minutes and memoranda prepared 
during the drafting process reveals the strong influence of inter-
national law on the drafting of the relevant sections protecting 
socio-economic rights. For example, the concepts of progressive 
realisation and resource availability in sections 26 and 27 were 
based on article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (the ICESCR). According to 
the Technical Committee, this formulation has the dual advan-
tage of facilitating consistency between South Africa’s domestic 
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law and international human rights norms, and directing the 
courts towards a legitimate international resource for the inter-
pretation of these rights.15
Some scholars have gone as far as suggesting that the embrace of in-
ternational law under the Constitution is perhaps overloaded. Olivier, 
for instance, states that ‘the Constitution adopts an approach which 
is unashamedly international law and comparative law friendly’16 and 
that ‘it is, therefore, no wonder that the courts have not hesitated to 
invoke the provisions of international instruments when interpreting 
fundamental rights, including those rights which have a socio-eco-
nomic character’.17 For a country with a sad and deep legacy of apart-
heid and international isolation – whose struggle for freedom was a 
matter of international concern and engaged the direct application of 
international law18 – it is unsurprising that the location of interna-
tional law, particularly international human rights law, is so central 
within post-apartheid South Africa’s constitutional framework. 
Again, it is unsurprising that the Constitution is strong in its guar-
antee of socio-economic rights, as the policy of apartheid not only de-
liberately created huge socio-economic gaps between different racial 
groups, but also condemned the majority black population to generally 
squalid living conditions that were characterised by massive depriva-
tions of socio-economic amenities. Socio-economic rights guarantees 
would thus help ensure that those deeply disadvantaged and deprived 
in society are provided with the necessary socio-economic safety nets 
so that they do not fall through the cracks into desperation and desti-
tution. It was in this spirit – the firm commitment to heal the divisions 
of the past through the achievement of, among other things, social jus-
tice19 – that during the Constitution negotiation process, the delega-
tion of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies emphasised 
the imperative to include guarantees of socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution. They argued that the guarantee of these rights would 
represent an ‘explicit commitment to the redress of the socio-economic 
legacy of apartheid’.20
The Constitutional Court reiterated this point in its first decision 
on socio-economic rights, Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwa-
Zulu-Natal,21 where Justice Chaskalson stated that South Africa re-
mained a society with great disparities in wealth and that millions of 
people continued to live in deplorable conditions and great poverty.22 
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He observed that ‘for as long as these conditions continue to exist, 
that aspiration will have a hollow ring’.23 Thus, the Constitution con-
tains a broad array of socio-economic rights.24 One of the hallmarks of 
this inclusion is that it makes the redress of poverty a matter of fun-
damental constitutional concern.25 This fits into the transformative 
project of the Constitution. As Mbazira argues, the Constitution is 
‘perceived as an instrument to transform South African society from a 
society based on socio-economic deprivation to one based on equal dis-
tribution of resources’.26 In this regard, he states that the guarantee 
of socio-economic rights is central to the transformation project as it 
seeks to reverse the skewed provision of services based on racial lines 
that formed one of the hallmarks of apartheid.27 Eide and Rosas also 
emphasise the central role of socio-economic rights in a transforming 
society. They state:
Taking economic, social and cultural rights seriously implies a 
simultaneous commitment to social integration, solidarity and 
equality, including the issue of income distribution. Economic, 
social and cultural rights include a major concern with the pro-
tection of vulnerable groups, such as the poor … Fundamental 
needs should not be at the mercy of changing governmental poli-
cies and programmes, but should be defined as entitlements.28
Slaughter has stated that a primary function of public international 
law is to influence and improve the functioning of domestic institu-
tions.29 In this regard, Scheinin forecasts that as the international 
implementation mechanisms of socio-economic rights are improved 
through, among other things, the introduction of complaint proce-
dures, ‘and as these developments and the operation of already ex-
isting procedures lead to institutionalised practices of interpretation, 
the possibilities for direct domestic applicability of treaties on social 
rights grow’.30 Piovesan also argues that international human rights 
law, in adopting the value of the primacy of the individual, interacts 
with the domestic protection system ‘in order to provide the great-
est possible effectiveness in protecting and promoting fundamental 
rights’.31 
This paper explores the vital role of international human rights 
law and jurisprudence, including the UN and African human rights 
systems and policy frameworks, in advancing socio-economic rights 
at the domestic level in South Africa. The paper starts by providing a 
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general overview of the international (including African regional) hu-
man rights system and their relevance. The paper proceeds to explore 
the question of the applicability of international human rights law un-
der the South African Constitution. In this regard, the paper provides 
an incisive discussion of the domestic application of international so-
cio-economic rights obligations in South Africa, paying special regard 
to the significance of General Comment 9 of the CESCR and the issue 
of minimum core obligations. The paper concludes with an exposition 
of some of the challenges in the application of international law in 
advancing socio-economic rights in South Africa and provides some 
recommendations.
2  OvERvIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIgHTS LAW SYSTEM
The international human rights law regime, as pointed out earlier, 
developed primarily within the framework of the UN but subsequent-
ly spread to the regional and sub-regional spheres. Piovesan states 
that the international human rights system reflects ‘a contemporary 
ethical conscience that is shared among states, to the degree that 
these invoke the international consensus on minimum protective pa-
rameters with regard to human rights’.32 Regional human rights sys-
tems include the African system, the European system and the Inter-
American system. 
At the normative level, the international human rights system 
comprises general global and regional treaties, on one hand, and sub-
sidiary specialised treaties, on the other.33 Global and regional trea-
ties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the ICESCR at the UN level; and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter), the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights, at the re-
gional level. Specialised treaties include the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (CAT) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), among others. 
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This section of the paper provides an overview of the international 
human rights law regime with reference to the UN and African re-
gional contexts34  as well as a synopsis of other regions.
2.1 Sources of international human rights law 
International human rights law is part of international law. To prop-
erly conceptualise it, one needs to understand its sources and for these 
one needs to look to general international law. Only a brief outline of 
the sources of international law are given here. For a more elaborate 
exposition, other works need to be consulted.35 
The starting point is article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute that is gener-
ally regarded as a complete statement of the sources of international 
law.36 There are five sources of international law recognised under 
the article: First, international conventions (treaties), which are writ-
ten agreements between states or between states and international 
organisations, operating within the field of international law.37 Inter-
pretation of treaties is generally governed by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 1969.38 Second, international custom (custom-
ary international law), which comprises rules that are based on set-
tled, widespread state practice, usually manifested over time (usus),39 
coupled with evidence of an intention to be bound by the practice as 
a legal obligation on the part of states (opinio juris).40 Third, general 
principles of law recognised by states, described in article 38(1)(c) of 
the ICJ Statute, which are common principles of law found in national 
legal systems insofar as they are suited for application to interna-
tional relations, in order to fill a gap in international law.41 Fourth, 
as subsidiary sources are judicial decisions, on which courts usually 
place heavy reliance. Fifth, teachings of the most highly qualified pub-
licists (such as commentators and distinguished authors, etc.) in vari-
ous nations also constitute subsidiary sources of international law ac-
cording to article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. In terms of the hierarchy 
of norms between treaties and customary international law, Dugard 
states: 
Although no provision is made for a hierarchy of sources, in most 
instances treaties, which take the place of legislation in the do-
mestic sphere, are viewed as the primary source while custom is 
the secondary source.42 
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2.2 The UN human rights system in a nutshell
The UN has played a pivotal role in the development of the interna-
tional human rights system, firmly placing human rights as a vital 
item on the international agenda. The UN human rights system is 
divided into two principal categories: the UN Charter-based system 
and the UN treaty-based system. Through these systems, the UN has 
adopted numerous binding treaties as well as non-binding declara-
tions and other soft-law instruments setting out fundamental norms 
of human rights as well as creating institutional arrangements for the 
effective guarantee of human rights. 
Before considering the Charter- and treaty-based systems, it is im-
portant to first briefly outline the role of principal UN organs, namely 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Security Council and the ICJ. 
The UNGA, established under article 7 of the UN Charter,43 is the 
UN’s representative organ, similar to Parliament in the domestic set-
ting, with the most wide-ranging mandate under the Charter. Under 
article 10 of the Charter, the UNGA may discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers 
and functions of any organs provided for in the Charter. In particular, 
with regard to human rights, article 13(1)(b) of the Charter states that 
one of the functions of the UNGA is to initiate studies and make rec-
ommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation 
in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields, and as-
sisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. All 
principal human rights instruments under the UN system have to be 
adopted by the UNGA.
The UN Security Council, established under article 7 of the UN 
Charter, does not have an express human rights mandate. Accord-
ing to article 24(1) of the Charter, the Security Council has the ‘pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’. Notwithstanding the absence of an express mandate, the 
Security Council has interpreted its mandate creatively and has sig-
nificantly contributed to the advancement of human rights through, 
among other things, the adoption of various resolutions and creation 
of special courts to hold perpetrators of grave human rights violations 
to account.
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), established under 
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article 7 of the UN Charter, is the UN’s principal organ with the pri-
mary mandate on issues relating to the advancement of human rights 
around the world. Article 68 of the UN Charter enjoins ECOSOC to 
set up commissions in economic and social fields for the promotion of 
human rights, as well as such other commissions as may be required 
for the performance of its functions. It is pursuant to this mandate 
that institutions such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (now 
HRC) and other Charter-based UN human rights bodies such as the 
CESCR have been set up.
The ICJ is the UN’s principal judicial organ. It has also, to some 
extent, contributed to the international discourse on socio-economic 
rights.44  
2.2.1 Charter-based system
The UN Charter-based system is a combination of normative and in-
stitutional arrangements. At the normative level, the UN system in-
cludes the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and numerous soft-law instruments adopted by the UN. In 
terms of the institutional framework, UN Charter-based institutional 
arrangements include the Human Rights Council, the Human Rights 
Council Advisory Committee (replacing the UN Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights), the UN Commission on the Status of Women, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees and the CESCR. 
2.2.1.1	 The	UN	Charter
The UN Charter is a key international human rights treaty that laid 
the foundation for the adoption of numerous human rights instru-
ments within the UN system and beyond. 
Article 1(3) of the UN Charter expresses, as one of its purposes, 
the achievement of international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. Article 55(c) provides further that ‘the United 
Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
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to race, sex, language, or religion’. Furthermore, under article 56 of 
the Charter, UN member states ‘pledge themselves to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achieve-
ment of the purposes set forth in Article 55’. The Charter set in motion 
‘a process of human rights standard-setting and enforcement that was 
hardly conceivable at the time’.45 The ICJ has held that articles 55 
and 56 of the UN Charter ‘bind Member States to observe and respect 
human rights’.46 
2.2.1.2	 The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights
The UDHR was adopted on 10 December 1948. It is a comprehensive 
catalogue of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.47 At 
the time of its adoption, the UDHR was not intended to be a binding 
human rights instrument. Its character was merely standard setting.48 
With the passage of time, however, the UDHR has been widely relied 
upon as an authoritative instrument in the resolution of human rights 
problems around the world and has either explicitly or implicitly in-
spired human rights provisions in numerous national Constitutions. 
International human rights instruments adopted after the adoption 
of the UDHR have expressly included a statement of inspiration from 
the UDHR. It has therefore been submitted that through such wide-
spread state practice in recognising and applying the provisions of the 
UDHR, coupled with implicit or explicit manifestations of a sense of 
legal obligation to comply with the guarantees under the UDHR, at 
least some of the guarantees under the declaration have subsequently 
crystallised into international customary law binding on all states.49 
2.2.1.3	 Soft-law	instruments
Apart from the UDHR, other influential Charter-based soft-law in-
struments bearing on socio-economic rights include the Vienna Dec-
laration and Programme of Action, the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger 
and Malnutrition and the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, 
among others. Soft-law instruments are important in international 
law discourse. Among other things, they provide evidence of state 
practice. Church observes: 
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There is a growing body of consensus that such instruments em-
body some form of pre-legal, moral or political obligation and 
can play a significant role in the interpretation, application and 
further development of binding international law norms, espe-
cially in the field of human rights law.50 
2.2.1.4		 The	Human	Rights	Council	and	its	Advisory	Committee
The Human Rights Council (HRC) was established in 2006 by a resolu-
tion of the UNGA,51 as a subsidiary body of the UNGA,52 charged with 
the responsibility of ‘promoting universal respect for the protection 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’.53 It has been 
tasked to address situations of violations of human rights, including 
gross and systematic violations, and to make recommendations in re-
spect thereof, and also to promote the effective co-ordination and the 
mainstreaming of human rights within the UN system. The HRC con-
sists of 47 member states, elected directly and individually through 
secret ballot by the majority of the members of the UNGA. Member-
ship is based on equitable geographical distribution, with Africa and 
Asia being the most represented regions on the Council.54 
The HRC’s mandate includes embarking on a new oversight and moni-
toring process called the ‘universal periodic review’ (UPR). This is a co-
operative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue and engages the 
full involvement of the country concerned, on the fulfilment of its human 
rights obligations and commitments. The mechanism is meant to comple-
ment rather than duplicate the work of various treaty bodies.55 
The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee was established 
by the HRC under its resolution 5/1 of 2007.56 The Advisory Commit-
tee functions as ‘a think-tank for the Council’,57 working under the 
Council’s direction.58 Its principal function is to provide expertise to 
the Council in the manner and form requested by the Council, focusing 
mainly on studies and research-based advice.59 The Committee com-
prises 18 independent experts from various regions of the world.60 
The HRC occupies a very important space in the field of human 
rights, being the foremost authoritative body sanctioned by the UNGA 
and the UN ECOSOC to oversee the fulfilment of the human rights 
mandate of the UN. The UPR, if creatively, candidly and boldly pur-
sued, can be a very important supervisory mechanism of the Council. 
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2.2.1.5	 The	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights
The office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 
was established in pursuance of one of the recommendations of the 
1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights through the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna Declaration).61 The 
UNHCHR is charged with the: 
principal responsibility for the United Nations human rights ac-
tivities under the direction and authority of the Secretary Gen-
eral, within the framework of the overall competence, authority 
and decisions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social 
Council and the Commission on Human Rights.62 
The current UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is Navanethem 
Pillay from South Africa.
2.2.1.6	 Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights
The CESCR was established by the Economic and Social Council as 
an oversight and monitoring body in respect of the ICESCR. This was 
in view of the fact that the ICESCR, unlike other principal UN hu-
man rights instruments, had no established treaty-based supervisory 
committee for such general oversight and monitoring, as discussed 
further below.63
2.2.2 Treaty-based system
Since its establishment, the UN has adopted an impressive array of 
human rights treaties that are part of the corpus of international hu-
man rights law. This section outlines the UN treaty-based system, 
providing an overview of its normative and institutional frameworks. 
Only the principal instruments directly related to socio-economic 
rights, namely the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC and CERD, are 
covered. 
2.2.2.1	 International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights
The ICESCR, together with the UDHR and the ICCPR, are usually 
referred to as the International Bill of Rights. This is because togeth-
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er they are the most general authoritative instruments at the inter-
national level, and most of the specialised treaties that have subse-
quently been adopted draw inspiration from them and seek to provide 
more clarity and content to the guarantees already contained in this 
‘International Bill of Rights’. The ICESCR was adopted together with 
the ICCPR on 16 December 1966 by the UNGA and entered into force 
on 23 March 1976. The ICESCR is the principal and most important 
international treaty in the area of socio-economic rights.64 
The ICESCR guarantees a comprehensive range of socio-economic 
rights, with the exception of the right to property. The rights guaran-
teed include the rights to self-determination,65 work,66 fair and just 
conditions of employment,67 joining and forming trade unions,68social 
security,69 housing,70 food,71 clothing,72 health,73 education74 and cul-
ture.75 
One of the central features of the ICESCR, which has dominated 
discourse on socio-economic rights, is the nature of obligations of state 
parties as expressed in article 2(1), entailing progressive realisation. 
It provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures. 
A lot of scholarly debate and jurisprudence have developed around the 
concepts of ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘minimum core obligations’ in 
respect of this article.76 
Furthermore, unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR did not create a su-
pervisory committee to monitor states parties’ implementation of the 
Covenant. A number of arguments were advanced against the estab-
lishment of such a supervisory committee at the time the ICESCR 
was adopted. Among other things, it was doubted whether it would 
be possible for a supervisory committee under the ICESCR to exercise 
quasi-judicial functions in respect of a set of rights that were subject to 
progressive realisation.77 Subsequently, however, the need was felt to 
come up with a supervisory committee in respect of the ICESCR. After 
the coming into force of the ICESCR, in 1976, ECOSOC established 
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a reporting mechanism under which states parties were to report to 
ECOSOC through the office of the UN Secretary General, on the im-
plementation measures they had adopted pursuant to the ICESCR.78 
In examining the reports, ECOSOC established a Sessional Working 
Group to assist with the exercise.79A lot of concerns were voiced on the 
effectiveness of the Sessional Working Group, resulting in ECOSOC’s 
decision to set up the CESCR as a replacement.80 Thus, strictly speak-
ing, the CESCR is a Charter-based rather than a treaty-based super-
visory body. It was established under the direct mandate of the UN 
Charter by ECOSOC. The Committee comprises 18 independent ex-
perts and meets twice every year. Until recently, its two core respon-
sibilities have been the examination of state party reports (including 
‘shadow’ or alternate reports from civil society organisations) and the 
issuing of interpretive general comments that define the content of 
the rights in the ICESCR and the obligations of state parties.
Over the years, the arguments that were advanced against the idea 
of establishing a supervisory treaty body in respect of the ICESCR 
seem to have fallen by the wayside. Firstly, around the world, socio-
economic rights have been enforced in international and domestic 
courts and tribunals (or forums). Thus the argument that socio-eco-
nomic rights guarantees are vacuous and not claimable is no longer 
sustainable. Secondly, the claim made by some specialised agencies 
that the work of the CESCR would duplicate their work and that they 
have better expertise in the area of socio-economic rights than such a 
committee would have is again no longer sustainable. Not only has the 
CESCR come up with an impressive catalogue of general comments 
on various socio-economic rights, which clearly have not duplicated 
any other body’s work, but it has more particularly defined the con-
tent of socio-economic rights in a more expert manner than any other 
body has done. Important norms that currently inform socio-economic 
rights discourse, such as the concept of minimum core obligations, 
have been developed by the CESCR.
Underscoring current understanding that socio-economic rights 
are justiciable, the UNGA recently adopted an Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR on 10 December 2008.81 The Optional Protocol creates 
a mechanism for interstate communications82 and individual com-
plaints83 to be determined by the Committee. It also sets up a vol-
untary inquiry procedure whereby the CESCR, upon receiving reli-
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able information indicating grave or systematic violations by a state 
party of any of the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR, may invite 
the country concerned to co-operate in the examination of the allega-
tions.84 This process is confidential. 
As is demonstrated further below, the ICESCR and the work of 
the CESCR have had a profound influence in shaping South Africa’s 
constitutional architecture insofar as socio-economic rights are con-
cerned. It has had a significant influence as well in the development 
of socio-economic rights jurisprudence in the country.
2.2.2.2	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights
The ICCPR is divided into six parts (apart from the preamble). Part I 
deals with the right to self-determination. Part II contains ‘overarch-
ing or structural provisions, in light of which [the substantive] human 
rights established in part III of the Covenant should be applied’.85 
Part IV establishes the supervisory mechanism of the ICCPR. This 
includes the establishment of the Human Rights Committee and the 
obligation of states parties to submit periodic state party reports to 
this Committee on the measures they have adopted to give effect to 
the rights recognised in the ICCPR and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights. It has been stressed that the important 
and universal character of the ICCPR is such that, unlike many other 
treaties, it does not have an option for denunciation once it is ratified 
or acceded to by a state.86
Article 2 of the ICCPR provides for the nature of the obligations 
of state parties. It provides that every state party has the obligation 
to respect and ensure ‘to all individuals within its territory and sub-
ject to its jurisdiction’ the rights recognised in the Covenant in a non-
discriminatory manner. It states that these obligations include the 
adoption of legislative and other measures to give effect to the rights. 
It also specifically provides for the obligation of state parties to ensure 
the right of every person within their jurisdiction to legal recourse and 
to get an effective remedy when their rights have been violated, even 
if the violator was acting in an official capacity. 
Article 28 of the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights Committee, 
which comprises 18 members, to oversee the implementation of the 
Covenant. Under article 40 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Com-
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mittee is mandated to receive state party reports. The initial report 
is required to be submitted within one year from the time of ratifica-
tion/accession. After that, state party reports are due whenever the 
Committee requires.87 The Committee has also adopted general com-
ments that serve as soft-law guides in the interpretation of the ICCPR 
provisions.88
With regard to complaints mechanisms under the ICCPR, article 
41 provides for an inter-state communications procedure. Further, the 
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides for an individ-
ual complaints mechanism, was adopted together with the Covenant 
on 16 December 1966. It is important to note that the Committee only 
receives communications from ‘individuals’ who ‘claim to be victims’. 
Thus, unlike under the African Charter, actios popularis (public inter-
est litigation) are not allowed under the ICCPR.89 Individuals wishing 
to access this procedure must first exhaust domestic remedies and 
anonymous communications or communications that amount to an 
abuse of the process cannot be considered by the Committee. 90
Through its individual communications procedure, the Human 
Rights Committee has been able to invoke some ICCPR provisions to 
advance socio-economic rights. This has been done principally through 
the equality clause.91 One of the most prominent decisions in this re-
gard is Zwaan-de Vries v The Netherlands92 where Mrs. Zwaan-de 
Vries was denied unemployment benefits on the grounds that she was 
married and was not a breadwinner. By contrast, men in similar cir-
cumstances in the Netherlands (those who were married and were not 
breadwinners) would still receive unemployment social security ben-
efits. Mrs. Zwaan-de Vries claimed discrimination in terms of article 
26 of the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee found in her favour, 
holding that the equal protection clause under article 26 of the ICCPR 
is not limited to the civil and political rights guaranteed under the IC-
CPR, but applies to socio-economic rights as well.93 
South Africa is a state party to the ICCPR as well as its First Op-
tional Protocol. Thus, although South Africa has not yet ratified the 
ICESCR and its Optional Protocol, it would still to some extent be sub-
ject to international quasi-judicial supervision by the Human Rights 
Committee in terms of socio-economic rights under the UN system.  In 
addition, the authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR by the Human 
Rights Committee is a very useful interpretative source as precedent 
for the South African Bill of Rights.
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2.2.2.3	 Other	principal	treaties	with	socio-economic	rights	obligations
Apart from the ICESCR and ICCPR, other treaties at the UN lev-
el that are very important in the field of socio-economic rights are 
CERD, CEDAW and CRC, all of which have been ratified by South 
Africa. All have supervisory committees – the CERD Committee, 
CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, re-
spectively. The CEDAW94 and the CRC95 have provisions that directly 
guarantee some socio-economic rights. The CERD Committee has in-
novatively interpreted the CERD’s non-discrimination provisions to 
protect socio-economic rights. In Ylimaz Dogman v The Netherlands96 
for instance, the CERD Committee considered a communication in 
which it was alleged that a labour authority and Cantonal Court had 
endorsed the termination of Mrs. Ylimaz, a Turkish national, from her 
employment. The employer’s letter requesting termination alleged 
that foreign women workers with children were more likely to be ab-
sent from work. The Committee held that the judicial affirmation of 
the termination failed to address the issue of racial discrimination in 
the employer’s letter and that in the premises, article 5(e)(i) of CERD, 
which prohibits discrimination in relation to the right to work, had 
been violated. The Committee recommended that the state party as-
certain whether Mrs. Ylimaz was now gainfully employed and that it 
should take steps to secure alternative work for her or provide other 
equitable relief. 
2.2.4 Special procedures
The UN human rights system has a mechanism for human rights 
monitoring and advocacy termed ‘special procedures’. Through this 
mechanism, the HRC addresses either specific country situations or 
thematic issues in all parts of the world.97 There are presently 30 the-
matic and eight country mandates. These special procedures consist in 
either an individual (variously called a ‘Special Rapporteur’, ‘Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General’, ‘Representative of the Sec-
retary-General’ or ‘Independent Expert’), or a working group, usually 
comprising five members, one from each region of the world. 
Under the special procedures, mandate holders are usually called 
upon to examine, monitor, advise and publicly report on human rights 
situations in specific countries or territories, known as country man-
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dates, or on major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide, 
known as thematic mandates. Various activities undertaken under 
the special procedures include responding to individual complaints, 
conducting studies, providing advice on technical cooperation at the 
country level and engaging in general promotional activities. Mandate-
holders of the special procedures serve in their personal capacity and 
do not receive salaries or any other financial compensation for their 
work.98
2.3 Regional systems
2.3.1 African human rights system
At the apex of the African human rights system is the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government established under article 6 of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU).99 The Assembly is the su-
preme organ of the AU. One of its important functions in relation to 
the enforcement of human rights is spelt out in article 9(1)(b) of the 
Act. It enjoins the Assembly to ‘consider and take decisions on reports 
and recommendations from the other organs of the Union’. A number 
of instruments address various issues of human rights at the African 
regional level. These include the African Charter, the African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Charter), 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol) and the 
African Union (AU) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (AU Refugee Convention).
2.3.1.1	 The	African	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights	and	the	African	Com-
mission	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights
The principal instrument under the African human rights system is 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Char-
ter, or the Charter), adopted on 27 June 1981. It is the most widely 
ratified regional human rights treaty, with all African countries, ex-
cept one,100 being state parties to it. The Charter expressly affirms the 
indivisibility and interconnectedness of all human rights, stating that 
‘civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social 
and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that 
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the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee 
for the enjoyment of civil and political rights’.101 The Charter’s affir-
mation of this indivisibility, interconnectivity, interdependence and 
universality stands out among all human rights treaties. 
Among the rights covered under the African Charter are the rights 
to property and development, which have been excluded from some 
major international human rights treaties such as the ICESCR and 
the ICCPR. 
One of the features of the African Charter that was noted early in 
its history is the existence of claw-back clauses that make the enjoy-
ment of rights under the Charter subject to the ‘law’.102 It is striking 
that these claw-back clauses are confined to civil and political rights 
and not socio-economic rights, with the exception of the right to prop-
erty. The clear impression one gets is that, given the climate of repres-
sion that prevailed among African states at the time the Charter was 
adopted, the confinement of the claw-back clauses to civil and political 
rights was meant to be a shield for repressive regimes against falling 
foul of the human rights guarantees by which they would otherwise 
be bound. Indeed, in practice, given the resource-based discourse on 
socio-economic rights, one would have expected that if the claw-back 
clauses were included in good faith, the converse scenario, where 
socio-economic rights would have been subject to the law, should have 
been the case. However, through creative interpretation, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) 
has emphasised that the reference to ‘law’ under these clauses refers 
to international rather than local law, stressing that a state cannot 
plead the provisions of its local law in order to escape international 
law obligations.103 
Another unique feature of the African Charter is the absence of 
an express limitation clause on rights, or a derogation clause. Again 
the African Commission has made its position on this point perfectly 
clear, holding that limitations on the rights and freedoms in the Char-
ter cannot be justified by emergencies or special circumstances.104 
In terms of socio-economic rights, the African Charter does not 
have a provision similar to that in the ICESCR which clearly sub-
jects the obligations of states parties to their resources and progres-
sive realisation. Thus others have argued that as a result, the Charter 
does not permit the concept of progressive realisation and that the 
obligations of states with respect to these rights under the Charter 
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are immediate.105 This is, however, not necessarily the case.106 The 
debate was explored in Purohit and Moore v The Gambia,107 where 
the African Commission held that there should be read into article 
16 the obligation on the part of states party to the Charter to take 
concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advantage of [sic] its 
available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully real-
ised in all aspects without discrimination of any kind.108 The decision 
does not definitively settle the point, though, as its context seems to 
have been confined to article 16(1) of the Charter, which, some of the 
proponents for the immediate obligations school of thought argue, is 
the only provision that permits progressive realisation.109 It remains 
arguable, though, that the reasoning in Purohit is equally applicable 
to all economic, social and cultural rights under the Charter and that 
the concept of ‘progressive realisation’ with regard to socio-economic 
rights is implicit therein. 
The supervisory mechanism devised under the African Charter is 
the African Commission. The Commission is established under article 
30 and charged with the responsibility to ensure the promotion and 
protection of the rights guaranteed under the Charter, as well as in-
terpreting the provisions of the Charter and performing other tasks 
entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.110 
It consists of 11 experts chosen from among African states. In inter-
preting the Charter, the Commission is entitled to draw inspiration 
from international human rights instruments and principles.111
With regard to state party reporting, this requirement is provided 
for under article 62. States parties are required to submit periodic re-
ports every two years. The African Charter requires that they report 
on legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter. The African 
Commission has issued guidelines for states for the preparation of the 
reports.
On complaints mechanisms, articles 47–62 describe the interstate 
communications procedure through which one state party may bring 
a communication against another, alleging violations of human and/or 
peoples’ rights. Articles 55–59 deal with ‘other communications’ – it 
is through this procedure that individual complaints are brought be-
fore the African Commission. The individual communications proce-
dure under the African Charter has been applauded for having the 
most liberal locus standi requirements. Public interest litigation is al-
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lowed under the Charter and one of the African Commission’s biggest 
achievements has been the development of creative jurisprudence. 
With regard to socio-economic rights, there has unfortunately been 
a paucity of jurisprudence from the Commission. Thus in the SERAC 
case, the Commission applauded the applicants for bringing a claim 
based on socio-economic rights, stating that:
The Commission thanks the two human rights NGOs who 
brought the matter under its purview: the Social and Economic 
Rights Action Center (Nigeria) and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights (USA). Such is a demonstration of the usefulness 
to the Commission and individuals of actio popularis, which is 
wisely allowed under the African Charter.112
It would appear that this is not necessarily a problem of the Commis-
sion’s own making, but rather that litigants and NGOs have not been 
forthright in bringing communications in this area before the Com-
mission. This, in turn, is not surprising as it only mirrors the situation 
prevailing at the domestic level in most African states. Socio-economic 
rights issues are scarcely litigated and since the procedure before the 
Commission requires that domestic judicial remedies be exhausted 
first, it cannot be expected that there would be a flurry of cases in this 
area coming to the Commission.
However, in the two most notable cases that have been determined 
by the Commission, it has again seized the moment and demonstrat-
ed its creativity. In the SERAC case, the Commission, among other 
things: 
(a) affirmed the fourfold obligations that states have with regard to 
socio-economic rights, namely, the obligations to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil, human rights;113 
(b) held that the rights expressly guaranteed in the African Charter 
do not constitute an exhaustive list and hence implied into the 
Charter the existence of other rights, such as the rights to food 
(through an interpretation of the rights to life, to the best attaina-
ble state of physical and mental health and to economic, social and 
cultural development)114 and housing (through an interpretation of 
the rights to property, to the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health and to protection of the family);115 and
(c) affirmed the application of the concept of minimum core obliga-
tions under the Charter.116 
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As is argued further below, the reading into the African Charter of the 
concept of minimum core obligations has treaty law implications for 
South Africa, whose highest court (the Constitutional Court) has re-
fused to apply the concept. In the Purohit case, as shown above, the 
Commission most notably read into the Charter the concept of ‘progres-
sive realisation’ within available resources that the framers of the Char-
ter seem to have inadvertently omitted to include in the instrument.
The African human rights system still has some weaknesses, 
though. As Hansungule points out, one of its greatest challenges has 
been the lack of implementation of the decisions or recommendations 
of the African Commission. He argues that there has been nothing 
tangible or concrete from the Commission’s pronouncements in in-
stances where states are found to have violated rights guaranteed un-
der the African Charter.117
2.3.1.2	 Special	mechanisms
Pursuant to its mandate under article 45 of the African Charter, the 
African Commission may, under article 46, ‘resort to any appropri-
ate method of investigation’. In this regard, the African Commission 
has tried to be proactive in coming up with special procedures, such 
as the appointment of Special Rapporteurs with specific mandates to 
investigate human rights situations and generally promote human 
and peoples’ rights guaranteed under the Charter. It is a matter of 
serious concern, however, that notwithstanding the equal status un-
der the Charter between civil and political rights, on one hand, and 
socio-economic rights, on the other, , no Special Rapporteur has been 
appointed to address a specific theme of socio-economic rights.118 On a 
positive note, however, the Commission has set up a Working Group 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and one of the Commission-
ers, Angela Melo of Mozambique, is a member of the Working Group. 
Currently, the African Commission is at a consultative stage in the 
process of developing principles and guidelines on economic, social 
and cultural rights in the African Charter.119 
Unlike the procedure in the UN system, the special procedures un-
der the African system have generally been viewed as largely ineffec-
tive. This is for two main reasons. First, the African Commission suffers 
from woeful under-funding from the AU. Secondly, it has been argued 
that unlike the special procedures in the UN system where independ-
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ent experts are appointed, Commissioners under the African system 
allocate the Special Rapporteur mandates among themselves and, this, 
combined with the fact that their work is part time and that most of 
them already complain of having too much work, means their work as 
special rapporteurs has not been as effective.120
2.3.2 A synopsis of other regions
2.3.2.1	 European	human	rights	system
Socio-economic rights are guaranteed in the European Social Charter 
(ESC)121 and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE).122 
Article 25 of the ESC establishes the European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR) that, among other things, hears individual complaints 
from states parties on matters relating to the ESC. European insti-
tutions have demonstrated preparedness in promoting and enforcing 
socio-economic rights. In European Roma Rights Centre v Greece,123 
for instance, the ECSR noted that the right to housing permits the 
exercise of many other rights – civil and political, and economic, social 
and cultural – and that it was of central importance to the family.124 
The Committee noted that there was consistent case law on the point 
that in order to satisfy the right to family life protection, states must 
promote the provision of an adequate supply of housing for families 
and take the needs of families into account in housing policies and, 
further, must ensure that existing housing is of an adequate stand-
ard and includes essential services. In addition, the Committee held 
that ‘adequate housing’ requires a dwelling of suitable size.125 Fur-
thermore, the obligation to promote and provide housing extends to 
security from unlawful eviction.126 The Committee also held that while 
illegal occupation may justify the eviction of the illegal occupants, the 
criteria for categorising occupation as illegal must not be unduly wide 
and that any eviction should take place in accordance with prescribed 
rules of procedure which should be sufficiently protective of the rights 
of the persons concerned.127
2.3.2.2	 Inter-American	human	rights	system
Although socio-economic rights were expressly guaranteed under the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, the same 
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were left out in the subsequent and binding American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969 (the American Convention).128 However, regional 
supervisory institutions, such as the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the 
Inter-American Commission) have consistently held that the two in-
struments ought to be read together, and, with that approach, they 
have sought to protect and enforce socio-economic rights. The Inter-
American Commission in Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosica v Dominican 
Republic,129 for instance, recalled that while the American Convention 
replaced the American Declaration as the primary human rights in-
strument in the Inter-American system with respect to the Dominican 
Republic, the Convention could not be interpreted to exclude or limit 
the effect of the Declaration or other international instruments. In 
this case, the Commission found the government of the Dominican 
Republic to have violated the petitioners’ right to education by dis-
criminatorily depriving them of their legal identity under domestic 
law and thereby disqualifying them from enrolment in school. It held 
that the obligations under article 19 (rights of the child) of the Ameri-
can Convention included the right to education, since education gives 
rise to the possibility of children having a better standard of living 
and generally contributes to the prevention of unfavourable situations 
for children and for society.
3 THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIgHTS 
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
There are two major schemes under which international law applies 
in South Africa. These two schemes, it is submitted, are the ‘bind-
ing international law scheme’ and the ‘non-binding international law 
scheme’. The first scheme finds expression in sections 231–233 of the 
Constitution. These provisions provide for the application of interna-
tional agreements130 and customary international law131 in South Af-
rica. They also provide interpretive guidance, stating that courts are 
duty bound to pay due regard to international law in the interpreta-
tion of legislation with a view to ensuring that an interpretation is 
adopted that favours congruence rather than inconsistency between 
national law and international law.132 In the case of Kaunda and Oth-
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ers v President of South Africa and Others,133 the Constitutional Court 
held that ‘[t]his [approach] must apply equally to the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole’.134 Non-binding inter-
national law finds expression in chapter 2 of the Constitution – the 
Bill of Rights.135  
This section of the paper explores the status and application of in-
ternational law in South Africa, with particular focus on international 
human rights law.
3.1  International agreements
The general status and effect of international treaties in South Africa 
is provided for in section 231 of the Constitution. The section reveals 
and affirms a number of features that characterise the application of 
international agreements in South Africa. First, the provision makes 
it clear that South Africa continues to adopt the dualist approach with 
regard to the application of international agreements. Hence, ‘any in-
ternational agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted 
into law by national legislation’.136 The same section goes further to 
provide that ‘a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsist-
ent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament’. Second, section 231 
seeks to balance the distribution of power with regard to the applica-
tion of treaty law to, and in, South Africa.137 Thus, while it vests the 
responsibility of negotiating and signing international agreements in 
the Executive branch of government,138 it requires, as a general rule, 
that the ratification of such treaties should receive the prior approval 
of Parliament.139 
3.2  Customary international law
The application of customary international law in South Africa is gov-
erned by the provisions of section 232 of the Constitution. Again, in 
tandem with conventional practice in most dualist common law ju-
risdictions, customary international law automatically forms part of 
the domestic law unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
national legislation.140 
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3.3 bill of Rights approach
In addition to the specific provisions for the general application of in-
ternational law in South Africa, chapter 2 of the Constitution makes 
special provision for the role of international human rights law in 
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Section 39(1)(b) provides that 
‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must 
consider international law’. This provision provides a twofold set of 
obligations – one binding and another non-binding. In the case of Gov-
ernment of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, Jus-
tice Yacoob held that ‘section 39 of the Constitution obliges a court 
to consider international law as a tool to interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights’.141 Thus in Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others (Mazibuko case),142 pursuant to this provision, notwithstand-
ing South Africa’s non-ratification of the ICESCR, the High Court of 
South Africa (Witwatersrand Division) considered articles 11 and 12 
of the ICESCR that guarantee respectively the rights to an adequate 
standard of living and health.143 It affirmed and applied the reasoning 
of the CESCR in General Comment 15 on the right to water,144 includ-
ing the essential elements of availability and accessibility,145 in inter-
preting the right to water under section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution, 
holding that the state is under an obligation to provide the poor with 
water and water facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.146
However, the court, tribunal or forum is not bound to apply in-
ternational law, unless the same is directly applicable as domestic 
law in terms of sections 231 and 232 of the Constitution. The term 
‘consider’ as used in section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution is inherently 
of non-binding import. In Azanian Peoples Organisation v President 
of the Republic of South Africa147 the Court held that section 39(1)(b), 
and the general scheme of the Constitution, bear out a presumption of 
consistency between international law and domestic law. Justice Mo-
hammed stated that lawmakers of the Constitution should not lightly 
be presumed to authorise any law which might constitute a breach of 
the obligations of the state in terms of international law.148
Dugard, a leading South African international law publicist, has 
stated that the requirement to consider international law under sec-
tion 39(1)(b) refers to all the sources of international law recognised 
by article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.149 In this regard, a careful analysis 
of the jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court shows that a sys-
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tematic and holistic approach to the application of international law 
is yet to be fully embraced by the Court. The Court’s application of 
international law has focused on treaties and judicial or quasi-judi-
cial decisions, frequently with footnoted references to the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists. Little attempt has been made 
to explore the existence and applicability of international custom 
and general principles of law recognised by nations, and how these 
can be creatively and innovatively applied in interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.150 Botha states that an examination of South African constitu-
tional law jurisprudence shows that ‘the distinction between foreign 
and international law has not been fully realised’;151 that ‘reference 
has often been passing, cursory and largely “ceremonial”’152 and that 
the ‘number and nature of international sources used, has, by and 
large, been uncreative to say the least’.153 This view is supported by 
Church et al., who argue that with the possible exception of the AZA-
PO and Kaunda cases, cursory reference to international law stands 
out in the judgments where individual judges have made reference to 
international law.154 Snellman makes a similar observation, stating: 
[w]hen the Constitutional Court does use international law, it 
will often only be a list of relevant conventions but with no fur-
ther analysis or comparison with South African law as if it is 
done only because the Court is obliged to [do so] by the Constitu-
tion.155 
A picture therefore emerges that, although South African courts have 
made reference to international human rights law in dealing with Bill 
of Rights issues, there remains a lot of room for improvement in the 
analysis and interpretation of international law in constitutional (and 
more particularly, Bill of Rights) jurisprudence.
Furthermore, in assessing the role that international human rights 
law has played and ought to play on the domestic scene in South Af-
rica, it is submitted that the principle of subsidiarity must be consid-
ered and applied where necessary. The principle is to the effect that 
international law should not arrogate to itself the regulation of those 
aspects of the polity that can be effectively addressed by national law 
that is closest to the people affected. This position was affirmed by 
the Constitutional Court in AD and DD v DW and Others156 where 
Justice Sachs held that according to the principle of subsidiarity, in-
ternational law applies if there is ‘a paucity of statutory guidance’ or 
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there is otherwise a lacuna in the law.157 Thus the import of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity is that the primary port of call when deciding a 
legal point on an issue is local law, and international law applies as a 
subsidiary regime. 
4 APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIO-ECO-
NOMIC RIgHTS ObLIgATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
In providing specific guidance on the domestic application of the ICE-
SCR, CESCR General Comment 9 on the Domestic Application of the 
Covenant158 emphasises two fundamental principles in the application 
of international law – that a state cannot rely on its national law to 
evade its international obligations and that it must ensure that there 
are effective remedies for violations of rights guaranteed under the 
ICESCR.
The extent to which this General Comment is relevant in South 
Africa is not entirely clear in view of the fact that South Africa is 
yet to ratify the ICESCR. Despite this, the general principle that a 
state that has signed an international treaty, such as South Africa, 
must avoid conduct that defeats the object and purpose of the treaty159 
would still operate to restrain South Africa from departing from these 
fundamental principles. Secondly, as noted earlier, South Africa is a 
party to the African Charter, articles 60 and 61 of which provide that 
relevant international instruments can be adverted to and applied in 
interpreting the obligations of states under the Charter. Thus, it is 
submitted that, insofar as South Africa’s socio-economic rights obliga-
tions under the African Charter are concerned, General Comment 9 
and other general comments of the CESCR are highly persuasive, and 
that South Africa has a positive duty under the African Charter to 
recognise the concept of minimum core obligations.
4.1 State of domestication of international socio-economic 
rights obligations in South Africa
This section of the paper explores the extent to which South Africa, 
whether directly or indirectly, has domesticated international law 
norms whether through Constitutional or other legislative measures.
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4.1.1 Influence of international law in South Africa’s constitutional architecture
The framers of South Africa’s Constitution were highly inspired by 
international law, particularly with respect to human rights. Justice 
Ackermann observed in the case of Bernstein and Others v Bester and 
Others NO,160 that ‘[t]he internal evidence of the Constitution itself 
suggests that the drafters were well informed regarding provisions 
in international, regional and domestic human and fundamental 
rights’.161 
The impressive extent to which socio-economic rights are guaran-
teed in the Constitution offers a paradox in relation to the country’s 
non-ratification of the ICESCR, an instrument to which the over-
whelming majority of states around the world are now parties.162 How-
ever it seems arguable that although South Africa is yet to ratify the 
ICESCR, it has, to a large extent, transformed the provisions of the 
Covenant into its domestic law. As Mbazira points out: 
[t]here is ample evidence to suggest that the drafters of the 1996 
Constitution of South Africa … were greatly inspired by the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
… which explains why most socio-economic rights provisions are 
drafted along the same lines as those in the ICESCR. 
He continues:
The differences between the Constitution and the ICESCR are at 
best nomenclatural [as] a closer scrutiny shows that the obliga-
tions engendered by the two instruments are similar in many 
respects.163 
In the First Certification case, the Constitutional Court made express 
reference to the ICESCR as a fulcrum upon which it based its assess-
ment of the conformity of the final text of the South African Constitu-
tion with the constitutional principles in guaranteeing socio-economic 
rights.164 Among other things, the Court expressly referred to and ap-
plied the provisions of article 2(1) of the ICESCR. The Court observed 
that the nature and enforceability of socio-economic rights differ ma-
terially from those of other rights since they are generally not fully 
enforceable immediately and that each state party only binds itself ‘to 
the maximum of its available resources’ to ‘achieving progressively’ 
the full realisation of these rights.165 In the Grootboom case, the Con-
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stitutional Court similarly observed that the term progressive realisa-
tion ‘is taken from international law and Article 2.1 of the Covenant 
in particular’.166 
Thus it is submitted that while the South African Constitution has 
not directly incorporated the provisions of the ICESCR, it has largely 
transformed the provisions of the ICESCR into its text; and hence, in 
essence, in unique circumstances, has domesticated the Covenant pre-
ratification. However, it is a differently nuanced form of domestication 
that does not go along with concomitant binding international law 
obligations under the treaty thus domesticated.
With regard to the other instruments referred to above, and in re-
lation to socio-economic rights, apart from the general statement that 
the framers considered them in drawing up the Constitution, there is 
no evidence of the direct and specific influence that they had in the 
language and content of the Constitution.
4.1.2 Influence of international law in legislation
Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the country has adopt-
ed a series of legislation with a view to giving effect to the rights guar-
anteed in the Constitution, and in some cases, also expressly aimed at 
giving effect to South Africa’s international human rights obligations. 
This section of the paper explores the role and impact of international 
law in the conceptualisation, interpretation and implementation of 
various pieces of legislation in the area of socio-economic rights. The 
legislation explored covers the following thematic areas: labour, hous-
ing, health and social security.
4.1.2.1	 Labour	rights
Labour rights are economic rights. Although South Africa has not rat-
ified the ICESCR, which contains comprehensive provisions on labour 
rights, it is a party to various other treaties, most notably a series of 
ILO Conventions that require it to comply with certain international 
human rights standards relating to labour.167 
Also, section 23(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right of eve-
ryone to fair labour practices. Further, subsections (2)–(6) of the Con-
stitution guarantee various associational rights pertaining to partici-
pation in labour union activities. Three principal pieces of legislation 
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stand out and are analysed here in relation to the country’s constitu-
tional and international law obligations.
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) was, among other pur-
poses, enacted in order to give effect to section 23 of the Constitu-
tion and also to give effect to public international law obligations of 
South Africa relating to labour relations, particularly the obligations 
incurred by South Africa as a member state of the ILO. Section 3 of 
the LRA provides that:
Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions –
to give effect to its primary objects;
in compliance with the Constitution; and 
in compliance with the public international law obligations of 
the Republic.
It is clear from these provisions that international law has a prominent 
role to play in the LRA framework. The obligation under section 3(c) to 
interpret the provisions of the Act in ‘compliance with the public inter-
national law obligations’ of South Africa is couched in mandatory terms. 
Gauging from the references to international law in the purposes of the 
legislation as expressed in the long title, the preamble as well as the 
operative provisions of the Act, it is submitted that the LRA transforms 
the general international law on labour relations, particularly applica-
ble ILO Conventions, into South African domestic labour law.
The purposes for which the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
75 of 1997 (BCEA) was passed are broadly similar to those relating 
to the LRA and similar express references are made to South Africa’s 
international law obligations.168
The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) again makes simi-
lar references to the Constitution and international law as the LRA 
and the BCEA. In its section 3 on interpretation, after making similar 
provisions to sections 3(a) and (b) of the LRA, the EEA goes further in 
subsection (d) to specifically provide that:
[a]ny person applying [the] Act must interpret its provisions in 
compliance with the international law obligations of the Repub-
lic, in particular those contained in International Labour Or-
ganisation Convention (111) concerning Discrimination in Re-
spect of Employment and Occupation. 
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Thus, it is submitted that this provision transforms ILO Convention 
111 into South African law through the EEA.
In conclusion, it seems clear that international labour law, which 
forms part of the general corpus of international human rights law, 
has a key role to play in the interpretation and application of labour 
legislation in South Africa.
4.1.2.2	 Housing	rights
Article 11 of the ICESCR guarantees the right of everyone to ‘ade-
quate housing’ and each state party is required to ‘take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right’. Pursuant to article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR, every state party is under an obligation to take steps 
‘to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization’ of this right.
This provision is mirrored in section 26 of the South African Con-
stitution, which provides that:
Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisa-
tion of this right.
No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home de-
molished, without an order of court made after considering all 
the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions.
In the Grootboom case, Justice Yacoob advanced an argument for the 
proposition that article 11 of the ICESCR and section 26 of the Con-
stitution are distinguishable. He stated that:
The differences between the relevant provisions of the Covenant 
and our Constitution are significant in determining the extent 
to which the provisions of the Covenant may be a guide to an 
interpretation of section 26. These differences, in so far as they 
relate to housing, are:
The Covenant provides for a right to adequate housing while sec-
tion 26 provides for the right of access to adequate housing.
The Covenant obliges states parties to take appropriate steps 
which must include legislation while the Constitution obliges 
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the South African state to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures.169
It is submitted, however, that the textual differences between the 
ICESCR and the Constitution are not that significant. First, the dis-
tinction between a ‘right to adequate housing’ and the ‘right of access 
to adequate housing’ seems superficial. Conceptually, one struggles to 
sift out the true difference. Secondly, Justice Yacoob states that there 
is a difference between ‘appropriate’ steps and ‘reasonable’ steps. 
Again the distinction here seems very fine and tenuous, and, it is sub-
mitted, not significant. It is hard to conceive of a situation where steps 
adopted could be appropriate but not reasonable, or vice versa. 
With this background, it is now germane to examine various pieces 
of legislation on housing and locate the role played by international 
law in their conceptualisation and implementation. Relevant legisla-
tive frameworks in this regard include the Housing Act 107 of 1997, 
the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (RHA), the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) and the Prevention of Illegal Evic-
tion from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). All 
these pieces of legislation make clear in their respective preambles 
that they have been adopted in terms of section 26 of the Constitution, 
which provides that everyone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing, and that the state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right. It has already been demonstrated that the 
terms ‘adequate housing’, ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘within avail-
able resources’ have direct international law origins. Thus interna-
tional law is a necessary interpretive tool in the enforcement of these 
pieces of legislation. 
The RHA goes further to specifically state, among other things, 
that it is premised on the constitutional imperative that ‘no one may 
be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without 
an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstanc-
es’. The Act seeks to balance the rights of tenants and landlords and 
to create mechanisms to protect both against unfair practices and 
exploitation. Among the stated aims of the legislation is the promo-
tion of availability and accessibility to adequate housing by the people 
of South Africa through the creation of mechanisms that ensure the 
proper functioning of the rental housing market. On analysis, although 
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the Act does not specifically make reference to its international law 
origins, it is evident that international law, particularly the guidance 
from the CESCR through its general comments, played a pivotal role 
in the conceptualisation of this Act. For instance, the core principle 
against forced evictions without due process, although directly flowing 
from the language of section 26 of the Constitution, seems traceable 
to General Comment 4 of the CESCR,170 where the Committee stated, 
among other things, that 
notwithstanding the type of tenure, all persons should possess 
a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection 
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats.171 
With regard to section 3 of the RHA that makes provision for govern-
ment rental subsidies, and other assistance measures to stimulate the 
supply of rental housing property for low income people, again it is 
clear that this directly mirrors the interpretive guidelines of the CE-
SCR in General Comment 4 where the Committee stated that ‘States 
parties should establish housing subsidies for those unable to obtain 
affordable housing, as well as forms and levels of housing finance which 
adequately reflect housing needs’.172 Hence, what emerges again with 
the RHA is the strong influence of international law in its conceptuali-
sation, and hence the critical need to make reference to the same as an 
interpretive tool during implementation and/or enforcement.
PIE, as its name suggests, seeks to offer protection to those who 
would otherwise be liable to forced evictions on account of various 
grounds, including lack of tenure due to lack of title. It emphasises the 
constitutional prohibition of evictions without an order from a compe-
tent court. As Chenwi observes: 
The main criterion as to whether an eviction should proceed and 
how it should proceed is whether the eviction will be “just and 
equitable”. This amounts to asking whether the eviction will be 
fair. This criterion is emphasised in section 4(6) and (7) and sec-
tion 6(1) of PIE.173 
According to section 6(3) of PIE:
In deciding whether it is fair to grant an order for eviction, the 
court must have regard to – (a) the circumstances under which the 
unlawful occupier occupied the land and erected the building or 
structure; (b) the period the unlawful occupier and his or her family 
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have resided on the land in question; and (c) the availability to the 
unlawful occupier of suitable alternative accommodation or land.
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,174 Justice Sachs 
held in this context that:
justice and equity would take account of the extent to which seri-
ous negotiations had taken place with equality of voice for all 
concerned. What is just and equitable could be affected by the 
reasonableness of offers made in connection with suitable alter-
native accommodation or land, the time scales proposed relative 
to the degree of disruption involved, and the willingness of the oc-
cupiers to respond to reasonable alternatives put before them.175 
It is observable that some of the guidelines of the CESCR in General 
Comment 7 on the right to adequate housing in the context of forced 
evictions are mirrored in PIE. The CESCR has stated that there are 
instances where evictions may be justifiable, such as in the case of per-
sistent non-payment of rent or of damage to rented property without 
any reasonable cause,176 but that in such instances, relevant legisla-
tion must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such in-
terferences may be permitted.177 The CESCR notes that in such cases, 
it is incumbent upon the relevant authorities to ensure that evictions 
are carried out in a manner warranted by a law and that all the legal 
recourses and remedies are available to those affected.178 The CESCR 
has further stated that evictions should not result in individuals be-
ing rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other human 
rights. It stresses that where those affected are unable to provide for 
themselves, the state party must take all appropriate measures, to 
the maximum of its available resources, to ensure that adequate alter-
native housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as the case 
may be, is available. A close reading of PIE shows that these guide-
lines, arguably, influenced its consideration and enactment.
4.1.2.4	 Social	security	rights
The right to social security is guaranteed under section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution that provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have access 
to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants, appropriate social assistance’. Giving effect to 
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this provision is the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. Among other 
things, the Social Assistance Act provides for some safety-net grants 
and these include child protection grants, disability grants, old-age 
grants and other direct financial or material provisioning from the 
state with regard to social security.179 All of the grants mentioned in 
section 4 are tied to citizenship, and, with the decision in the Khosa 
case,180 they extend to permanent residents. However, there is provi-
sion for the Minister to make exceptions under section 5(1)(c) of the 
Act, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, and extend the 
application of the Act to other groups or categories of persons. In ad-
dition, section 13 of the Act provides that the Minister may provide 
social relief of distress to a person who qualifies for such relief as may 
be prescribed. 
The preamble to the Act states that it was passed in view of the 
right to social security as guaranteed under the Constitution. In the 
Khosa case, Justice Mokgoro, delivering the majority judgment, stat-
ed that the Director-General of the Department of Social Development 
had stated in his evidence that ‘social security legislation is part of the 
government’s strategy to combat poverty’181 and that ‘the legislation 
is directed at realising the relevant objectives of the Constitution and 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and giving effect to 
South Africa’s international obligations’.182
It is unclear what specific international law obligations influenced 
the drafting of the legislation and which the legislation is aimed at ad-
vancing. This is the more so considering that South Africa has neither 
ratified the ICESCR nor the ILO Social Security (Minimum Stand-
ards) Convention of 1952 (ILO Convention 102). Be that as it may, the 
Director-General’s message is clearly that the legislation aims at giv-
ing effect to South Africa’s international law obligations. The Direc-
tor-General’s position is also significant as it shows that at least some 
policy makers in Government are sensitised about the importance of 
heeding the country’s international human rights law obligations.
4.1.3 International human rights law and South African Courts
This section explores the extent to which South African courts in par-
ticular have invoked international law in their jurisprudence, focus-
ing again on labour, housing, health and social security.
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4.1.3.1	 Labour	rights	jurisprudence
An examination of South African labour legislation has shown that 
international law, particularly the various conventions adopted by the 
ILO, feature very prominently in their concept and design. However, 
the best test of the impact of international human rights law in their 
enforcement, it is submitted, would best be reflected in the manner in 
which courts have interpreted and enforced these instruments. It ap-
pears that perhaps more than any other branch of human rights law, 
international labour law has been highly influential in the work of the 
courts in determining labour disputes. In Discovery Health Limited v 
Commissioner for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Oth-
ers,183 the Labour Court of South Africa stated that ‘the importance of 
international standards as both a substantive and an interpretational 
tool is underscored by sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution’.184 Fur-
ther, in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, Justice O’Reagan 
held in South African National Defence Union V Minister of Defence 
and Another185 that:
Section 39 of the Constitution provides that when a court is in-
terpreting chapter 2 of the Constitution, it must consider interna-
tional law. In my view, the conventions and recommendations of 
the International Labour Organisation (the ILO), one of the old-
est existing international organisations, are important resources 
for considering the meaning and scope of … section 23 of our 
Constitution.186
In that case, the Constitutional Court applied the ILO Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 87 of 
1948 and the ILO Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining 98 of 1949 in arriving at a decision that soldiers had the 
right to form their own workers’ union although they are not necessar-
ily employees in the normal sense. Justice O’Reagan stated that:
If the approach of the ILO is adopted, it would seem to follow 
that when section 23(2) speaks of ‘worker’, it should be inter-
preted to include members of the armed forces, even though the 
relationship they have with the Defence Force is unusual and not 
identical to an ordinary employment relationship.187
She held that although members of the Defence Force may not be 
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employees in the full contractual sense of the word, their conditions 
of enrolment in many respects mirror those of people employed under 
a contract of employment.188 This case provides a classic instance in 
which the reasoning of the Court was clearly influenced by interna-
tional conventions on labour.
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v 
Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and Another,189 the Constitutional Court, again 
applying the two ILO Conventions mentioned above, proceeded to em-
phasise the importance of the supervisory committees of the ILO: the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recom-
mendations190 and the Freedom of Association Committee. The Court 
held that the work of these Committees engenders ‘an authoritative 
development of the principles…contained in the ILO conventions’,191 
and that ‘[t]he jurisprudence of these committees…will be an impor-
tant resource in developing the labour rights contained in our Consti-
tution’.192
Justice Chaskalson held in S v Makwanyane that international law, 
within the meaning of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, includes 
both binding as well as non-binding law.193 A classic exemplification 
of this position in the context of labour rights arose in the Discovery 
Health case (above) where the Labour Court considered and applied 
the International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families, 1990, although South Africa has nei-
ther signed nor ratified the instrument. The Court said:
The Convention aims ultimately to discourage and even eliminate 
irregular migration, but at the same time, it aims to protect the 
fundamental rights of migrants, taking into account their vulner-
able position. Although the Convention has not been ratified by a 
significant number of countries (South Africa has not ratified it) it 
remains a significant statement of international norms in relation 
to the rights of migrant workers. The Court is therefore required 
to consider its terms when interpreting domestic legislation.194 
The Court then proceeded to examine and apply various ILO con-
ventions, observing in particular that ‘ILO Convention 143 (Migrant 
Workers [Supplementary Provisions] Convention 1975) builds on 
Convention 97 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) 1949, 
and sets out the general obligation of members states to respect the 
basic human rights of all migrant workers (see Article 1)’,195 while ‘at 
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the same time, the Convention addresses problems associated with 
clandestine immigration’.196 All in all, it is evident that international 
human rights law has played a pivotal role in the interpretation, de-
velopment and enforcement of labour rights in South Africa. 
4.1.3.2	 Housing	rights	jurisprudence
In section 4.1.2.2 above, this paper demonstrated that South African 
legislation in this important area of human rights is, to some extent, 
reflective of international law. In this section, the influence that in-
ternational law has had on the judicial enforcement of the right to 
housing is explored.
Most prominent in the panoply of jurisprudence that has devel-
oped around the right to housing is the Grootboom case. In that case, 
the Court extensively considered international law, particularly the 
provisions of the ICESCR and the general comments of the CESCR. 
The Court elaborately engaged the concept of minimum core obliga-
tions as defined under CESCR General Comment 3, and the decision 
is renowned for its refusal to adopt the concept within the context of 
the right to housing in South Africa, and opting instead to adopt the 
reasonableness test for addressing the socio-economic rights of those 
in desperate circumstances and ensuring that government policies 
adopted to address such rights do not leave out significant sectors of 
the population. The implications of the Court’s approach in this regard 
are discussed in more detail below. Apart from its refusal to embrace 
the concept of the minimum core, the decision is significant for, among 
other things, its affirmation of the important role that international 
human rights law, particularly the ICESCR, played in fashioning the 
socio-economic rights provisions of the Constitution. The Court stated 
that the term ‘progressive realisation’ under the Constitution ‘is taken 
from international law and Article 2.1 of the [ICESCR] in particu-
lar’.197 The Court then commended the CESCR for helpfully analysing 
the term in the context of housing in paragraph 9 of its General Com-
ment 3,198 which clarifies the meaning of the term ‘progressive realisa-
tion’.199 In applying the General Comment to its interpretation of the 
meaning of the term ‘progressive realisation’ with reference to socio-
economic rights generally, and the right to housing in particular as 
used under the South African Constitution, the Court observed that:
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Although the committee’s analysis is intended to explain the scope 
of states parties’ obligations under the Covenant, it is also help-
ful in plumbing the meaning of “progressive realisation” in the 
context of our Constitution. The meaning ascribed to the phrase 
is in harmony with the context in which the phrase is used in our 
Constitution and there is no reason not to accept that it bears 
the same meaning in the Constitution as in the document from 
which it was so clearly derived.200
In the Joe Slovo case, Justice Ngcobo, applying the guidelines of the 
CESCR in its General Comment 7, said:
General Comment No. 7 provides a useful guide to determining 
the obligations of government when it seeks to relocate people 
for the purposes of providing them with adequate housing. The 
requirement of genuine consultation with the people affected by 
relocation under General Comment No. 7 is consistent with the re-
quirement of engagement that we have insisted upon before people 
are evicted. It is also consistent with our jurisprudence on PIE. In 
my view General Comment No. 7 must, as a general matter, be 
followed in relocations such as the ones involved in this case.201
The general picture that emerges is thus that international human 
rights law, particularly the ICESCR and the general comments of the 
CESCR, have played a very important role in the judicial enforcement 
of the right to housing.
4.1.3.3	 Health	rights	jurisprudence
The right to health is guaranteed under sections 27(1)(a) and 27(3) of 
the Constitution. Section 27(1)(a) provides that ‘[e]veryone shall have 
access to health care services, including reproductive health care’, 
while section 27(3) provides that ‘no-one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment’.
In its earliest decision directly engaging the right to health care, 
more particularly the right to emergency medical treatment under 
section 27(3) of the Constitution – Soobramoney case – the Constitu-
tional Court decided the case without referring at all to international 
law. It is unclear why this was so, but considering that section 39(1)(b) 
of the Constitution makes it mandatory for the Court to consider in-
ternational law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, it is submitted 
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that this decision should be regarded as having been made per incu-
riam (decided without reference to an appropriate authority which 
would have been relevant to the judgment), as the Court clearly failed 
to apply its mind to a relevant body of law, and its precedential value 
on the basis of its ratio dacidendi (the rule or principle on which the 
case is ultimately decided) is therefore, at the very least, highly at-
tenuated. This is particularly so considering that the decision of the 
Court was adverse to the applicant.
In the subsequent case of Minister of Health and Others v Treat-
ment Action Campaign and Others,202 the Court took cognisance of, 
and indeed applied international law, but only to a narrow extent. The 
Court’s consideration of international law was limited to the concept 
of ‘minimum core obligations’ that it had earlier engaged in Groot-
boom in the context of the right to housing. The Court essentially af-
firmed the approach adopted in Grootboom, refuting the application 
of the concept in South Africa. The case is rather disappointing as the 
Court does not proceed to define the content of the right that the case 
engaged. Reference to the general comments of the CESCR is limited 
to General Comment 3 that defines the general nature of the obliga-
tions of states parties to the ICESCR as spelt out in article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR. One would have expected that even if, as was the case, the 
Court had decided to adopt reasonableness as a standard by which to 
measure the state’s compliance with its constitutional socio-economic 
rights obligations, it should have elaborated on the scope of the right 
and, in that regard, engaged CESCR General Comment 14 on the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health.203 The essential elements 
of the right to health as defined under the General Comment, namely 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality, could in any given 
case be useful in deciding a matter that turns on this right.204 In ad-
dition, the Court would have benefited from an analysis of the mini-
mum core obligations in relation to the right that, under the General 
Comment, include the duty to provide essential drugs, as from time to 
time defined under the World Health Organization (WHO) Action Pro-
gramme on Essential Drugs205 and to ensure equitable distribution of 
all health facilities, goods and services.206 In terms of section 39(1)(b) 
of the Constitution, it is submitted that the Court was bound to at 
least consider General Comment 14 that directly relates to the right 
to health. While the Court in the Soobramoney case failed to pass the 
constitutional test by not considering international law, it excelled in 
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another sense over its subsequent decision in TAC, as it extensively 
considered the content of the right to emergency medical treatment as 
provided for under section 27(3) of the Constitution.
4.1.3.4	 Social	security	rights	jurisprudence
The question of social security was considered by the Constitutional 
Court in the Khosa case. The Court, specifically addressing the right 
to social security, held that given that the Constitution expressly pro-
vides that the Bill of Rights enshrines the rights of all people in the 
country, and in the absence of any indication that the rights under 
section 27(1) of the Constitution are to be restricted to citizens as in 
other provisions in the Bill of Rights, ‘the word “everyone” in this sec-
tion cannot be construed as referring only to “citizens”’.207 Millard ar-
gues that the Khosa case ‘signalled a departure from the introspective 
and nationalistic approach towards social assistance that previously 
characterised the South African system’.208
However, the Court made no reference at all to international law. 
This is so notwithstanding the requirements of section 39(1)(b) of the 
Constitution and the fact that the Director-General responsible for 
social security stated in evidence before the Court that the impugned 
social security legislation was aimed at, among other things, giving 
effect to South Africa’s international law obligations. There are nu-
merous decisions on the question of non-discrimination in the area of 
social security that the Court could have drawn on, from various in-
ternational and regional human rights tribunals, including the Euro-
pean and the Inter-American systems, as well as jurisprudence from 
the Human Rights Committee of the UN.
4.2 Minimum core obligations and the South African approach: 
Grootboom and subsequent jurisprudence 
One of the defining features of socio-economic rights is that gener-
ally the obligation of states relating to their implementation is to take 
steps to the maximum of their available resources in order to achieve, 
progressively, the full realisation of the rights. There are a number 
of ways in which the phrase ‘progressive realisation’ may be open to 
misinterpretation. One of them is the possibility of states interpreting 
the provision as entitling them to postpone indefinitely the taking of 
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steps aimed at realising the rights. In this regard, the CECSR has 
made it clear that the fact that realisation over time is foreseen under 
the ICESCR should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation 
of all meaningful content.209 The CECSR has thus stressed that while 
the ICESCR provides for progressive realisation and acknowledges 
the constraints faced by states due to the scarcity of resources, ‘it also 
imposes various obligations which are of immediate effect’.210 These 
are the obligations to ensure that the rights under the ICESCR are 
enjoyed without discrimination,211 and the obligation of states parties 
‘to take steps’,212 which obligation, according to the CESCR, ‘is not 
qualified or limited by other considerations’.213 
In addition, most notable has been the CESCRs elaboration on 
what it has termed the ‘minimum core obligations’.214 Although others 
have doubted whether the Committee should indeed be credited with 
developing the idea of minimum core obligations, it seems that while 
it is true that the idea is inherent in the very nature of socio-economic 
rights, the CESCR was the first to give it expression and meaning 
and should therefore accordingly be credited with developing, though 
perhaps not necessarily originating, the concept.215 In paragraph 10 of 
General Comment 3, the Committee gave expression to the minimum 
core obligations in the following terms:
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, 
as well as by the body that preceded it, over a period of more than 
a decade of examining States parties’ reports the Committee is of 
the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfac-
tion of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, 
a State party in which any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, 
of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of edu-
cation is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under 
the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as 
not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be 
largely deprived of its raison d’être. By the same token, it must be 
noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged 
its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource 
constraints applying within the country concerned. Article 2(1) 
obligates each State party to take the necessary steps “to the max-
imum of its available resources”. In order for a State party to 
be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
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obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations.
Bilchitz, in a seminal article on the concept, concisely describes how 
the notion of minimum core obligations is to be understood within the 
broader framework of the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights. He argues that what progressive realisation entails is a recog-
nition that the government is under an obligation to: 
provide core services to everyone without delay that meet their 
[urgent] survival needs and then qualitatively to increase these 
services so as ultimately to meet the maximal interests that the 
state is required to protect.216 
He argues:
 [w]ithout protecting people’s survival interests, all other inter-
ests and rights that they may have – whether civil, political, so-
cial or economic – become meaningless.217 
and that the 
recognition of a minimum core of social and economic rights that 
must be realised without delay attempts to take account of the 
fact that certain interests are of greater relative importance and 
require a higher degree of protection than other interests.218 
Bilchitz’s approach is germane as it rests on the underlying philoso-
phy of the inherent and universal nature of fundamental rights, and 
the fact that the content of rights and the means to realising them are 
two issues that should not be conflated.219
As indicated above, the Constitutional Court extensively consid-
ered the concept of minimum core obligations, as elaborated by the 
CESCR, in the Grootboom case. The Court rejected the concept of 
minimum core obligations as a benchmark for the determination of 
the minimum essential level, or ‘the floor beneath which the conduct 
of the state must not drop if there is to be compliance with the obliga-
tion’220 to ensure the realisation of the right, in the Grootboom case, of 
access to adequate housing. The amici curiae in the case – the South 
African Human Rights Commission and the Community Law Cen-
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tre (University of the Western Cape) – argued that the right under 
section 26 had to be interpreted in the light of international human 
rights law and consistent with guidance from the general comments of 
the CESCR. In particular, emphasis was placed on the need to adopt 
the concept of minimum core obligations expressed in General Com-
ment 3 (cited above).221 
The Court stated that there are difficult questions relating to the 
definition of minimum core in the context of the right, in particular 
whether the minimum core obligation should be defined generally or 
with regard to specific groups of people.222 The Court reckoned that 
there may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have 
regard to the content of a minimum core obligation to determine 
whether the measures taken by the state are reasonable, but went on 
to state that ‘even if it were appropriate to do so, it could not be done 
unless sufficient information is placed before a court to enable it to 
determine the minimum core in any given context’.223 In this case, the 
Court held that it did ‘not have sufficient information to determine 
what would comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of 
our Constitution’.224 Thus the Court concluded that ‘the real question 
in terms of our Constitution is whether the measures taken by the 
state to realise the right afforded by section 26 are reasonable’. In 
terms of what would constitute ‘reasonableness’, in the context envis-
aged by the Court, it held that:
To be reasonable…those whose needs are the most urgent and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not 
be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the 
right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of reasonableness to 
show that the measures are capable of achieving a statistical ad-
vance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the Constitution 
requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. If 
the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the 
needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the test.225 
The Court’s stance in refusing to apply the minimum core concept has 
received a barrage of criticism.226 Bilchitz argues that the only logical 
way for the Court to arrive at the conclusions it reaches in Grootboom 
about what would constitute reasonable measures would necessarily 
have to entail some form of the minimum core. He contends that in 
holding that it is unacceptable for people in desperate need to be left 
Redson Edward Kapindu

without any form of assistance the Court in essence implies recogni-
tion of the minimum core concept. Another instance he highlights is 
where the Court states that ‘a society must seek to ensure that the 
basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a society based 
on human dignity, freedom and equality’.227 Bilchitz thus concludes by 
arguing that: 
[i]n attempting to avoid recognising a minimum core obligation, 
[Justice Yacoob] ends up smuggling an obligation to meet short-
term needs into the very notion of reasonableness itself. It would 
certainly be more transparent and theoretically coherent to rec-
ognise what he is actually doing outright.228
Indeed, on critically examining Grootboom, it is submitted that the 
Court did implicitly accede to the concept of minimum core content. 
This is so in light of its holding that for persons in desperate need, 
the state is bound to take immediate interim measures of relief, even 
if they do not constitute housing, provided that they fulfil the requi-
site standards of durability, habitability and stability. The Court thus 
seems to unwittingly hold that these measures constitute the mini-
mum core content for the right to housing.229 
These critiques notwithstanding, the importance of the Grootboom 
case in infusing into South African jurisprudence the application of 
international human rights law cannot be understated. For instance, 
although the Court did not follow the interpretation of the CESCR, 
the Court observed that determining the requirements of a minimum 
core obligation might assist in determining the scope of the state’s ob-
ligation to develop reasonable legislative and other measures. It also 
held that courts are competent to determine what might constitute a 
minimum core if sufficient information is available and presented to 
them.230 In addition, the Court affirmed that the meaning and under-
standing of the term ‘progressive realisation’ under the ICESCR is the 
same as that under the Constitution. As De Vos puts it: 
In Grootboom, the Court relied directly on General Comment 3 
issued by the [CESCR] to explain the parameters of the justicia-
bility of social and economic rights, and explicitly endorsed a 
passage from General Comment 3 regarding the meaning of the 
term “progressive realisation” in the context of the South African 
Constitution.231
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Further, the fact that the Court was prepared in the first place to ex-
tensively consider and interrogate the role of international law norms 
in articulating the human rights obligations of the state is also very 
significant.
In the subsequent TAC case, the issue of the application of mini-
mum core obligations was again raised by two of the three amici curiae 
– the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Com-
munity Law Centre. The Court started by recognising that although 
the minimum core might not be easy to define, it includes
at least the minimum decencies of life consistent with human 
dignity. No one should be condemned to a life below the basic 
level of dignified human existence. The very notion of individual 
rights presupposes that anyone in that position should be able to 
obtain relief from a court.232
With such a statement, one would think that in a society founded on 
the values of human dignity, freedom and equality, the recognition of 
minimum core obligations would be held to be indispensable. How-
ever, the Court then strays from its recognition of the importance of 
the minimum core and raises two major objections to the application 
of the minimum core in South Africa. The first objection is content 
based, with the Court stating that: 
it is impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” service im-
mediately. All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the 
state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-econom-
ic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.233 
The Court stated that although Justice Yacoob indicated that evidence 
in a particular case may show that there is a minimum core of a partic-
ular service that should be taken into account in determining whether 
measures adopted by the state are reasonable, the socio-economic rights 
under the Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to 
demand the provision of the minimum core as of right.234 
The second objection is based on institutional competence. The 
Court held that in dealing with socio-economic rights:
courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging 
factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what 
the minimum-core standards…should be, nor for deciding how 
public revenues should most effectively be spent.235 
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The Court proceeded to argue that courts are ill-suited to adjudicate 
upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and econom-
ic consequences for the community.236 The Court preferred instead: 
a restrained and focused role for the courts…to require the state 
to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to 
subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.237 
The Court stated that such determinations of reasonableness may 
have budgetary implications, ‘but are not in themselves directed at 
rearranging budgets’.238
It seems that although the Court declined to expressly allow for the 
application of the minimum core concept, it in essence used that very 
conception in defining the basic requisites under the reasonableness 
approach, such as the need to ensure that at a minimum, provision 
is made to those in desperate need. The Court in the TAC case thus 
lends itself to a similar fallacy as that in Grootboom in rejecting the 
application of the concept. 
In the Mazibuko case, the High Court sought to make a case that 
the Constitutional Court did not reject the applicability of the mini-
mum core concept in South Africa. Justice Tsoka held that the Court 
in Grootboom did not reject the concept but only emphasised the dif-
ficulties associated with its application and that the same could be 
said of the decision in the TAC case.239 His argument however, does 
not appear convincing. In Grootboom, Justice Yacoob concluded his 
analysis on the minimum core by saying that ‘[i]t is not in any event 
necessary for a court to determine in the first instance the minimum 
core content of a right’.240 In TAC, the Court said ‘the socio-economic 
rights of the Constitution should not be construed as entitling anyone 
to demand that the minimum core be provided to them’241 and further 
that ‘it is impossible242 to give everyone access even to a “core” serv-
ice immediately’.243 These conclusions by the Court seem inconsistent 
with the conclusion that Justice Tsoka draws and clearly suggest a 
rejection of the concept’s applicability in South Africa.
 In connection with the African Charter, there is a problem in the 
refusal of South African courts to apply the minimum core obligations 
concept. While South African courts might perhaps safely rest on the 
fact that the country has not yet ratified the ICESCR and is thus not 
bound by it, and nor is it bound to follow guidance from the CESCR, 
South Africa has indeed ratified the African Charter. The African 
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Commission in the SERAC case observed that the minimum core obli-
gation forms part of the socio-economic rights obligations of state par-
ties under the Charter.244 Thus, it is submitted, South Africa is bound 
in terms of the African Charter to apply the concept of minimum core 
obligations.
5. CHALLENgES ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
The foregoing discussion has located the space occupied by interna-
tional human rights law in policy- and law-making, as well as in the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights through the courts in South Af-
rica. This is so notwithstanding the courts’ refusal to apply the im-
portant concept of minimum core obligations, opting instead to adopt 
a test of reasonableness that, it is submitted, does not help much in 
defining the content of socio-economic rights. It has been clear, never-
theless, that the effect of international law was very significant in the 
Grootboom, TAC, Discovery Health and Joe Slovo cases, among oth-
ers. South African courts have in varying but yet significant degrees 
used international human rights law to define the content and nature 
of socio-economic rights obligations under the Constitution.
However, as Brand argues, despite the valuable guidance interna-
tional law provides for the interpretation of socio-economic rights in 
the Constitution and the significant contribution it has made in this 
respect, one of the problems surmounted has been the continued ab-
sence of case law from other domestic jurisdictions.245 Brand adds: 
The absence of any effective method for the actual enforcement of 
the norms developed by the [CESCR] has meant that little atten-
tion has been devoted in international law to the difficult issues 
of separation of powers and institutional capacity that arise at 
the domestic level in the enforcement of court orders with respect 
to socio-economic rights.246 
He concludes that both these difficulties thus tend to:
dilute the usefulness of international norms as interpretative 
sources for socio-economic rights at the domestic level, particu-
larly as the South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
develops and becomes more concrete and specific.247
Redson Edward Kapindu
0
Another concern, raised by Okafor, is that in comparison with the UN 
system, the overall impact of the African system in South Africa has 
been rather minimal.248 He argues, quite correctly it is submitted, that 
socio-economic rights norms arising from the provisions of the Afri-
can Charter have percolated in much less measure into the reasoning 
when compared with those under the ICESCR. In addition, he argues, 
again convincingly, that in the deliberations or decision-making proc-
esses of the relevant South African domestic institutions, there has 
been a skewed pattern of the percolation of the African Charter into 
judicial reasoning in South Africa, with civil and political rights fea-
turing more that socio-economic rights.249 
This is a stinging, yet justified indictment of the rather ambivalent 
manner in which South African institutions have approached the Af-
rican human rights system’s instruments and institutions, especially 
insofar as socio-economic rights are concerned, and there is need for 
courts and the other relevant actors to orient themselves towards a 
better recognition and application of these instruments in the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the Bill of Rights.
Another challenge, as the above discourse demonstrates, is that 
with the exception of a few legislative themes, most notably labour 
law, the legislature has not expressly informed the legislation it 
passes with international law, even in cases where a large pool of in-
ternational law resources exists, as is the situation with regard to 
housing and social security. Express references to international law in 
legislation, such as is the case with labour legislation, creates a better 
platform for the courts to refer to and apply international law when 
enforcing socio-economic rights and also generally gives effect to the 
country’s international law obligations to adopt legislative measures.
6 gENERAL CONCLUSION
International law occupies significant space in South Africa’s con-
stitutional framework. South Africa has generally adopted a dualist 
approach in the direct application of international law, though this 
seems to be nuanced by some exceptions where international law is di-
rectly applicable without a further act of domestication. These are in-
stances where an international agreement concluded by South Africa 
is self-executing or where a rule of customary international law that 
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is not inconsistent with the Constitution or other legislation applies. 
Another avenue in the Constitution through which international law 
applies, particularly international human rights law, is pursuant to 
section 39(1)(b) as an interpretive tool for the Bill of Rights. The law 
that courts, tribunals and other forums are bound to consider in this 
regard includes both binding and non-binding international law. Me-
diating the importance, relevance and universality of international 
human rights law norms with local law and circumstances is the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity that essentially states that law-making and im-
plementation are often best achieved at a level that is not only effec-
tive, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive 
to their needs, to local distinctiveness and to population diversity.
Some concern is expressed, however, that in most instances, courts 
have not gone beyond making reference to a list of international law 
provisions that relate to a particular point they are considering with-
out further elaboration. This has left the impression that perhaps 
their reference to these provisions is just a veneer to show that they 
complied with the fiat under section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution when 
in fact, they did not practically consider such law in a manner such 
that it would influence their decision. 
In the field of socio-economic rights, one of the major setbacks is 
the fact that South Africa has not yet ratified the ICESCR and its 
Optional Protocol. This is so notwithstanding that South Africa has a 
very progressive Constitution in this regard and that the courts have 
equally been vigilant in asserting their competence to adjudicate on 
these matters. 
Another setback has been the refusal by the Constitutional Court 
to directly embrace the notion of minimum core obligations. As a re-
sult of the Court’s approach of rejecting to apply the concept of mini-
mum core obligations and adopting that of reasonableness instead, 
Currie and De Waal accurately observe that the Court’s approach to 
the positive obligations imposed on the state by socio-economic rights 
provisions under the Constitution has been to avoid giving content 
to those rights in favour of an adjudication of the reasonableness of 
the measures taken by the state to implement the rights.250 However, 
the reasonableness approach adopted by the Court, when taken to its 
logical conclusion, cannot achieve the desired results in the absence 
of an appreciation and application of minimum core obligations. Mini-
mum core obligations, it is submitted, make real the recognition that 
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socio-economic rights are basic fundamental rights and that no inter-
pretation thereof should be such as to empty them of all content. It is, 
however, appreciated that the nature of most of these rights is such 
that after meeting the requisite basic survival interests of the people, 
the obligation of the state is to take progressive steps within its avail-
able resources to achieve these rights.
An additional major challenge that has been noted is the dearth of 
reference to the African Charter and the jurisprudence, albeit admit-
tedly sparse, of the African Commission. These various concerns not-
withstanding, international law remains a prominent regime of law 
in the South African constitutional fabric and has played a significant 
role in shaping the country’s constitutional landscape. This paper has 
demonstrated that international human rights law has played a key 
role in the shaping of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in par-
ticular, as well as legislation and jurisprudence in the field of socio-
economic rights. Considering the important role of international law, 
the following recommendations are therefore made: 
1. South Africa should urgently ratify the ICESCR and the Optional 
Protocol thereto.
2. The Constitutional Court, at the earliest opportunity presented 
before it, should revisit its reluctance to recognise the concept of 
minimum core obligations and hold that the same is applicable in 
the South African context. Not only will this be important in de-
fining the content of socio-economic rights under the Constitution 
in their proper context, but it will also be a way of giving effect to 
South Africa’s existing international law obligations under the Af-
rican Charter.
3. The Courts, in dealing with international human rights law, should 
get even more creative and, where appropriate, they should be able 
to get beyond the confines of treaty law to exploring other sources 
of international human rights law, such as custom and general 
principles of law. This they can do by, among other things, explor-
ing state practice in the area.
4. Courts also need to get deeper in their analysis of international 
human rights law, as in many instances they have simply made 
fleeting references thereto.
5. South African courts should place sufficient weight on the African 
human rights system and its instruments in their work.
6. Civil society and other organisations that bring claims before the 
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courts or appear from time to time as amicus curiae also need to 
play a role in ensuring the desired creativity by the courts in tak-
ing a broader approach to international law, including the applica-
tion of regional law in this regard.
7. The legislature should include references to international law ob-
ligations when passing legislation. Thus the approach adopted by 
Parliament in couching labour law should be applied generally.
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